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          Abstract 
The  heterogeneous  connections  model  is  a  generalization  of  the  homogeneous 
connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in which the intrinsic value of 
each connection is set by a discrete, positive and symmetric function that depends 
solely on the types of the two end agents. Core periphery networks are defined as 
networks in which the agents' set can be partitioned into two subsets, one in which the 
members are completely connected among themselves and the other where there are 
no internal links. A two-type society is defined as "power based" if both types of 
agents prefer to connect to one of the types over the other, controlling for path length. 
An exhaustive analysis shows that core periphery networks, in which the "preferred" 
types are in the core and the "rejected" types are in the periphery, are crucial in the 
"power based" society.  In particular, if the linking costs are not too low and not too 
high, at least one such network is pairwise stable. Moreover, in many cases these 
networks are the unique pairwise stable networks and in all cases they are the unique 
strongly efficient networks. The set of efficient networks often differs from the set of 
pairwise stable networks, hence a discussion on this issue is developed. These results 
suggest heterogeneity accompanied by "power based" linking preferences as a natural 
explanation for many core-periphery structures observed in real life social networks.            
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 1 Introduction 
 
A  network  is  defined  to  be  a  core-periphery  network  if  its  set  of  agents  can  be 
partitioned into two subsets, the core and the periphery, such that each agent in the 
core is directly connected to all other core members while each periphery member is 
directly connected to none of the other periphery agents
1. In this paper we introduce a 
simple network formation model in which core periphery networks are the dominant 
architecture both as stabile networks and as efficient networks.  
Since the 1970's the empirical literature of social networks identified core periphery 
architecture  as  a  dominant  social  structure  in  many  contexts
2.  Core-periphery 
structures  were  found  in  macroeconomics  in  the  theory  of  spatial  division  of 
production (Krugman (1991, 1994) and Fujita et. al (2001)) and in the sociology-
oriented world system literature
3 (Wallerstein (1974), Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) 
and  Smith  and  White  (1992)).  These  architectures  were  found  also  in  industrial 
organization, both in general, in the analysis of firms' power structure as reflected in 
the interlocking directorates' network (Mintz and Schwartz (1981a, 1981b)) and in 
specific industries as the airline industry (Starr and Stinchcombe (1992)) and the local 
and  long  distance  phone  calls  industry  (Economides  (1996)).  Core-periphery 
structures  were  found  in  formal  and  informal  social  organizations  as  factions  and 
other quasi-groups based on recruitment by existing members (Boissevain (1968)), 
solidarity  networks  with  asymmetries  in  wealth  and  status  (Fafchamps  (1992)), 
scientific  networks  (Brieger  (1976),  White  et.  al.  (1976),  Mullins  et.  al.  (1977), 
                                                  
1 The core-periphery structure is not a well-defined concept in the social sciences literature. Indeed, 
most of the researches that use this phrase mean that there is one group of agents that is densely 
connected internally, while all the other agents are sparsely connected internally (Borgatti and Everett 
(1999)). The definition here is identical to the one in Bramoulle and Kranton (2003) and Bramoulle 
(2007). However, network is a core-periphery network by Goyal (2007) if the set of agents can be 
partitioned into two subsets, core and periphery, such that each agent in the core is directly connected 
to all other core members and each periphery member has a single link to one of the core members. 
Galeotti and Goyal (2008) restrict the pattern of links in a core periphery network to be complete – 
every peripheral agent is connected to all core agents. Later we will refer to the definition by Goyal 
(2007) as minimally connected core periphery networks and to the one by Galeotti and Goyal (2008) as 
maximally  connected  core  periphery  network.  In  the  mathematical  graph  theory  literature  core 
periphery networks are called split graphs (Foldes and Hammer (1977) and Brandstadt et. al (2004)).    
2  White  et.  al.  (1976)  mention  that  one  of  the  frequent  structures  they  encounter  has  one  group 
internally connected and one group internally disconnected which are reciprocally connected between 
them.  
3The theory states that national development could only be understood as the complex outcome of local 
interactions with an expanding world economy. Further, the world countries have hierarchical power 
order  of  core,  semi  periphery,  and  periphery  that  is  reflected  both  in  world  economy  and  in 
international relations. The core countries are stronger (e.g. military power) then others and exploit the 
weak  periphery  countries  either  by  tributes  or  by  favorable  market  conditions.  Therefore  the  core 
countries can be distinguished by their internal massive volume of trade and by their capital-intensive 
production.    3
Granovetter  (1983),  Grossman  and  Ion  (1995),  van  der  Leij  and  Goyal  (2006)), 
internal firms' networks (Krackhardt and Hanson (1993)
4) and in the social network of 
injecting drug users (Curtis et. al. (1995)). 
In most of the empirical examples mentioned above, it is evident that the members of 
the core have some intrinsic advantage over the members of the periphery – either the 
financial institutions that are positioned in the core of the directorates' network, the 
veteran members in factions or the eminent scientists in the scientific networks. In 
many cases these advantages do not initially stem from these core members' position 
in the network, but they lead their possessors to be extremely central in the social 
network. We suggests that in order for the advantageous agents to be placed in a 
central position they have to be recognized as more attractive by all the members of 
the  community,  advantageous  and  disadvantageous.  This  recognition  is  the  main 
source of power of the advantageous agents. Once these agents are placed in a central 
position in the social network, their advantage can be reinforced and perpetuated
5. 
Some  network  formation  models  in  the  social  sciences  literature
6  might  suggest 
explanations for the formation of core-periphery structures. Models associated with 
the  structural  balance  theory,  are  meant  mainly  to  explain  various  segregation 
architectures. Therefore, these models have to assume some internal animosity among 
the periphery members in order to explain the sparse internal network attributed to the 
periphery
7.  Models  associated  with  preferential  attachment  (also  known  as  degree 
variance model) need to assume that core members preceded the periphery members 
in the network. The extended preferential attachment model of Bianconi and Barabasi 
(2001) adds heterogeneity in the form of fitness into the links accumulation process 
                                                  
4 Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) consider the core-periphery structure as problematic for the firm since 
it signals that many workers depend on a small group of central agents. Borgatti (2005) considers it as 
favorable structure as efficient spreader of knowledge. However, he points out that  since the core 
controls the content of the knowledge, these networks might not be good at innovation because it 
makes  it    is  easy  for  the  conventional  wisdom  to  swamp  new  ideas  (see  also  Chubin  (1976),  
Granovetter (1983) and Bramoulle and Kranton (2003)).  
5Brieger (1976) and White et. al. (1976) found a hierarchy of statuses in the scientific network, where 
the  upper  "class"  was  known  by  all  the  lower  strata  but  unaware  of  most  of  them.  The  internal 
awareness of the lower "classes" was partial. Brieger (1976) clarifies (in a footnote) that the term 
"status" refers to differentiation of persons on some vertical continuum of "prestige" or "power".   
6  See Banks and Carley (1996) for a short survey of the main network formation theories in sociology 
and  Goyal  (2007)  and  Jackson  (2008)  for  network  formation  models  in  economics.  See  Newman 
(2003) for a survey of networked systems models in physics.  
7 In this theory, the social structure is a graph in which each link is one or more relations between two 
nodes where a signed number describes each relation. The value of a link is the sum of these numbers 
and the value of a cycle is the multiplication of its links values. The benefit of a person from a graph is 
the sum of values of all the circles that go through him. In the basic version, a cycle is balanced if and 
only if its value is positive and a social network is balanced if and only if all its cycles are balanced. 
Since people maximize their values, the theory argues that social networks that are balanced will be 
stable. See Heider (1946, 1958), Cartwright and Harary (1956), Newcomb (1956, 1961), Davis (1963, 
1967), and Doreian and Mrvar (1996).    4
and thus enables very fit agents to have higher degree than older, but not as fit, agents. 
Moreover, in order to generate the cohesiveness of the core, probably some rewiring 
should be introduced on top of the heterogeneity.  
Our framework is a generalization of the homogenous connections model of Jackson 
and Wolinsky (1996) to accommodate two types. As in the original model, the agents 
benefit from their direct connections (costly) and indirect connections. However, the 
benefits are a function of the two end agents (the intrinsic value of the connection) 
and the distance between them. In the homogeneous model, the star, a degenerative 
form of a core periphery network, appears as a dominant architecture. However, the 
star network is stable and efficient, independently of the central agent and therefore 
the  results  cannot  be  interpreted  as  a  process  of  power  perpetuation  by  central 
positioning in the social network.  
Some  models  introduced  heterogeneity  to  the  connections  model  of  Jackson  and 
Wolinsky (1996) through the linking costs rather than through the intrinsic values
8. 
The  important  difference  between  these  two  approaches  is  that  the  linking  costs 
heterogeneity  is  relevant  only  to  direct  connections,  while  the  intrinsic  values  are 
carried through both direct and indirect connections
9. Indeed, it turns out that none of 
the versions of the connections model which introduced heterogeneous linking costs 
exhibit core periphery networks as either stable or efficient. Moreover, core periphery 
networks in which there are more than two agents in the core were not found to be 
Nash networks in the various versions of the one-sided model of Bala and Goyal 
(2000)
10.      
                                                  
8 See Johnson and Gilles (2000), Jackson and Rogers (2005) and Carayol and Roux (2005). Note that 
core periphery networks might arise for certain parameters in the two-islands model of Jackson and 
Rogers (2005) if the internal linking costs of one island were lower from the external linking costs 
while the internal linking costs of the other island were higher from the external linking costs. 
9 This issue  was approached also by Galeotti (2006) and Galeotti et. al. (2006), which introduced 
heterogeneity  in  both  costs  and  benefits  to  the  one-sided  one-flow  and  the  one-sided  two-flow 
formation models of Bala and Goyal (2000), respectively. They find that cost heterogeneity affects both 
the connectedness and the architecture of the Nash networks. However, in the one-flow model the 
value heterogeneity affects both the connectedness and the architecture, while in two-flow it affects 
only the connectedness. We, on the other hand, find no effect of heterogeneity on the connectedness 
and a significant effect on the architecture.  
10    See  Galeotti  (2006),  Galeotti  et.  al.  (2006),  Hojman  and  Szeidl  (2008)  and  Feri  (2007).  Core 
periphery networks cannot be stable also in the framework of McBride (2006) unless possibly under 
certain parameters in the case where the agents know only their direct friends in the network. Hojman 
and Szeidl (2006) show the conditions under which a socially "gifted" agent becomes the center of their 
stable star architecture. However, it seems hard to extend this example to core periphery networks. 
Zeggelink (1995) introduces a network formation model with two types of agents. In this model the 
agents' loss depends on her deviation from her exogenous ideal state which is characterized by an ideal 
number of friends, all of them are similar to her. These myopic agents take part in a dynamic process, 
in which friendship connection must be reciprocated, until they reach as near as possible to their ideal 
position. However, none of the simulations of this model generated a core-periphery network.      5
Galeotti and Goyal (2008) suggest a homogeneous explanation for the formation of 
core  periphery  networks.  In  their  model,  an  agent  can  either  acquire  information 
personally or gather information from agents that acquired it personally. They show 
that  if  information  could  be  gathered  only  directly  from  one  of  the  agents  that 
acquired it personally, every stable network is a core periphery network where the 
core includes the agents that acquired the information personally and the periphery 
include the agents that need to gather the information through the network.  
In  what  follows  we  will  introduce  heterogeneity  into  the  connections  model  of 
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in order to analyze the case in which all the members of 
the society acknowledge the advantage of one of the types and therefore prefer linking 
to agents of this type over other agents. Under this setting of unanimous preferences 
towards the advantageous type, we will show that core periphery networks are both 
pairwise stable (unique in many cases) and uniquely efficient and discuss cases of 
tension between these two concepts. 
The next section will introduce the heterogeneous connections model and define a 
"power  based"  society.  It  will  also  define  several  special  architectures  of  core 
periphery networks that will become useful in the analysis. The third section will give 
a complete characterization of the stable and efficient networks of the "power based" 
society to show that core-periphery structures play a major role in this context. The 
last section will conclude with a detailed interpretation of the results and some natural 
and possible future research directions. 
   6




Consider  a  finite  set  { } n N , , 2 , 1 K =   of  utility-maximizing  agents.  The  complete 
network, 
N g , is the set of all subsets of N of size two, while the empty network is the 
empty set. The set of all possible networks on N is  { }
N g g g ⊆ | . Denote by ij the 
element of 
N g  that contains i and j. If  g ij∈  we say that agents i and j are directly 
connected  in  network  g.  Denote  by  ( ) { } g ij N j g i N ∈ ∈ = | ,   the  set  of  agent  i's 
neighbors in network g. Let  ij g +  denote the network obtained by adding the link ij 
to the network g and let  ij g −  denote the network obtained by severing the link ij 
from the network g. A path p of length  ( ) p L  between agent i and agent j in network g 
is a set of distinct nodes  ( ) ( ) { } 1 3 2 1 , , , , , + p L p L i i i i i K  such that  ( ) ( ) { } g i i i i i i p L p L ⊆ +1 3 2 2 1 , , , K  
and  ( ) j i i i p L = = +1 1 , . Let  p k ∈  and denote the position of agent k in path p by  ( ) p t
k , 
meaning,  ( )   k i x p t x
k = ⇔ = . If a path between agent i and agent j exists in network 
g, we say that agent i and agent j are connected in network g. Otherwise, we say that 
agent i and agent j are disconnected in network g. If agent i and agent j are connected 
but not directly connected in network g, we say that agent i and agent j are indirectly 
connected in network g. For a subset of the agents' set  N N ⊆ ′ , define a subnetwork 
g′  to  be  the  set  of  all  pairs  of  agents  N j i ′ ∈ , such  that  g ij∈ .  The  subnetwork 
g g ⊆ ′  is a component of network g if for all pairs of agents  N j i ′ ∈ , , agent i and 
agent j are connected in g' and there is no pair of agents  N N j N i ′ − ∈ ′ ∈ ,  such that 
g ij∈ . Denote by  ( ) g i N ,
~
 the set of agents that reside in the same component as agent 
i in network g.  If for each pair of agents  N j i ∈ , , agent i and agent j are connected in 
g, we say that g is connected. A path p between agent i and agent j in network g is a 
shortest path between those agents if there is no other path  p′ between them such 
that  ( ) ( ) p L p L < ′ . Denote the set of all shortest paths between agent i and agent j in 
network  g  by  ( ) g j i S , , ,  its  cardinality  by  ij s   and  the  path's  length  by  ij d .  Let 
( ) ( ) ( ) { } x s t s k g j i S s g x j i S
k k = ∈ ∈ = , | , , , , ,  be the set of all shortest paths between   7
agent i and agent j in network g such that agent k is in position x and denote its 





The homogeneous symmetric connections model without side payments  
 
Jackson  &  Wolinsky  (1996)  introduces  the  homogeneous  symmetric  connections 
model without side payments. In this model, the utility of agent i from network g is 
( ) ∑ ∑
≠ ∈
− =
i j g ij j
d
i c g u
ij
:
δ  where  1 0 < < δ  captures the idea that the value that agent i 
derives from being connected to agent j is proportional to their proximity and  0 > c  is 
the universal direct connection costs
12. The network g is pairwise stable with respect 
to the utility function if for every existing link, both its agents would not gain by 
severing it ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ij g u g u ij g u g u g ij j j i i − ≥ − ≥ ∈ ∀ , : ) and for every non-existing 
link, either at least one of its agents strictly loses from forming it or both agents do not 
gain from forming it ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ij g u g u g u ij g u g ij j j i i + > ⇒ > + ∉ ∀ : ). The network g 
is strongly efficient if there is no other network on N for which the sum of utilities 




i ′ ≡ ′ ≥ ≡ ≠ ′ ∀ ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
: ).  A  star 
network is a network in which there is a central agent who is directly connected to all 
other  agents  in  N  while  these  other  agents  are  connected  directly  only  to  her. 
propositions  1  and  2  in  Jackson  and  Wolinsky  (1996)  characterizes  stability  and 
efficiency  in  the  homogeneous  symmetric  connections  model  by  identifying  four 
possible relations between the linking costs and the depreciation factor
13. When costs 
are very low (
2 δ δ − < c ) the unique pairwise stable network and the unique strongly 
efficient  network  is  the  complete  network.  When  the  costs  are  intermediate 
( δ δ δ < < − c
2 ) the star network is pairwise stable (but not unique) and the unique 
                                                  
11  Note that  ( ) ( )
( )
ij
g i N k
k










12    The  optimization  problem  of  the  individual  in  this  model  can  be  interpreted  as  some  kind  of 
centrality  maximization  problem  under  costs  constraint.  It  departs  from  the  common  centrality 
measures  both  by  considering  linking  costs  and  by  using  an  exogenous  depreciation  parameter 
(although similar concepts of distance depreciation appear in the closeness centrality  measure, the 
information centrality measure and the attenuation parameter suggested first by Katz (1953) and used 
by Bonacich (1987) and many others). This model is very simple and therefore entails some strong 
assumptions as centrality maximization (see Shimbel (1953) for reservations), positive externalities 
(see the coauthors model in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for negative externalities) and shortest paths 
as the only source of utility (for reservations see Stephenson and Zelen (1989)).            
13  See Jackson (2008) for similar results given a more general distance-based benefit function.    8








c ) the empty 
network is pairwise stable (each agent in any other pairwise stable network has at 
least two links), while the star network is the unique strongly efficient network (but, 









δ δ )  the  empty  network  is  pairwise  stable  and  the  unique  strongly 
efficient network. Later, we will use the fact that nothing in these results changes if 
the utility function of the agent is  ( ) ∑ ∑
≠ ∈
− =
i j g ij j
d
i c A g u
ij
:
δ  for a positive constant A
14.  
 
Figure 1: Graphical summary of propositions 1 and 2 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for the 
case of n=10. The X-axis is the depreciation rate (δ ) and the Y-axis is the linking costs (c). 
 
                                                  
14 Mathematically, instead of accounting for the linking costs in the various cases of these propositions, 
one should refer to the linking costs normalized by the parameter, meaning to
A
c
.   9
The heterogeneous symmetric connections model without side payments  
 
We allow for two types of agents in the framework described above, such that there 
are  0 > k  type a agents and  0 > l  type b agents ( n l k = + ). The agent's utility from 
each  connection  is  a  function  both  of  her  proximity  to  the  other  agent  (as  in  the 
homogeneous model) and of the intrinsic value that this agent provides her
15. Thus, 
the utility of agent i from network g is  ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑
≠ ∈
− =
i j g ij j
j i
d
i c t t f g u
ij
:
, δ  where  { } b a ti , ∈  
and  ( ) j i t t f ,   is  the  intrinsic  value  function.  We  assume  that  the  intrinsic  value 











b t t w
t t w









,   (Jackson  and  Wolinsky  (1996)  use  1 1 2 3 = = = w w w ). 
The intrinsic value function might be interpreted as inducing a social norm regarding 
the benefit from connections in the society. In this paper we will concentrate on the 
case in which  3 2 1 w w w > > . In this case, both types prefer a connection to an agent of 
type a over a connection of the same length to an agent of type b
16. Therefore, we call 
a society with such values of the intrinsic value function a "power based" society 
since  the  agents'  preferences  could  be  interpreted  as  an  attraction  towards  the 
powerful
17.  Note  that  type  a  is  the  preferred  type  for  exogenous  reasons,  and  in 
particular, for reasons which are independent from the network structure. For future 




A network g is a core-periphery network if there is a partition of the set of agents into 
two subsets K (the "core") and L (the "periphery") such that  N L K = ∪ ,  φ = ∩ L K  
and  g ij K j i ∈ ∈ ∀ : ,   while  g ij L j i ∉ ∈ ∀ : , .  Various  classes  of  core-periphery 
                                                  
15 This is the term used by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) while describing the general connections 
model. 
16 Since the function is symmetric one can interpret these weights as strength of ties in the sense of 
Granovetter (1973). The highest value reflects both power and homophily, the second reflects only 
power and the third reflects only homophily. This interpretation and the results that follow are in line 
with  the  findings  of  van  der  Leij  and  Goyal  (2006)  regarding  the  core  periphery  architecture  of 
economists' coauthorships, in which strong ties are found to exist mainly between core members.  
17 Following Boorman and Levitt (1973) one can interpret "power based" society in a genetic context. 
Every individual would like to establish a link with a bearer of better genes in order to increase his 
siblings' fitness. However, it is hard to apply it to indirect connections.    10
networks can be characterized by the pattern of the direct connections between the 
core agents and the periphery  agents (see figure 2). For every periphery  member, 
L i∈ ,  define  his  core  as  the  set  { } g ij K j j M i ∈ ∈ = , |   and  denote  its  size  by 
i i M m = .  For  every  core  member,  K j∈ ,  define  his  periphery  as  the  set 
{ } g ij K i i N j ∈ ∈ = , |  and denote its size by  j j N n =  (denote the size of the biggest 
periphery by  j
j
n N max =  and the size of the smallest periphery by  j j n N min = ). A 
core-periphery network g is disconnected if there are no direct connections between 
periphery  agents and core agents ( 0 : = ∈ ∀ i m L i ). A core-periphery network g is 
maximally connected if each periphery agent is directly connected to all core agents 
( K m L i i = ∈ ∀ : ). Note that if the division of the agents to core agents and periphery 
agents  is  known,  the  disconnected  core-periphery  network  and  the  maximally 
connected  core-periphery  network  are  unique.  A  core-periphery  network  g  is 
minimally connected if each periphery agent is directly connected to exactly one core 
agent ( 1 : = ∈ ∀ i m L i ). A minimally connected core-periphery network g is one-gate 
if all periphery agents are directly connected to the same core agent (the gate) and 
only to her ( 1 : = ∈ ∀ i m L i  and  j i M M L j i = ∈ ∀ : , )
18. If the division of agents to 
subsets is known, then the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network is 
unique under the unlabeled set of networks (similar to the star network).  
                                                  
18 For the importance of the exact characterization of the links between heterogeneous  groups see 
discussion in page 96 of Zeggelink (1995) and especially footnote 11.     11
 
Figure 2: Core-periphery networks (agents A,B,C are the core agents, agents 
D,E,F are the periphery agents). 
 




Define the relative contribution of  ( ) g i N k , ∈  to the connection between agent i and 




ij t t f
s
s
g k j i RC
ij ,
2
, , , δ ≡
19. It is therefore trivial to note that  
( )
( )
( ) j i
d
g i N k
t t f g k j i RC




. Define the total relative contribution of neighbor k 
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Lemma 1: If g is pairwise stable then for each pair of agents i and k, such that  g ik ∈ , 
( ) 0 , , ≥ g k i TRC . 
 
                                                  
19 This notion of contribution is intuitively close to the betweeness centrality measure (see Freeman 
1982).    12
The proof (as all other proofs) is relegated to the appendix. We will use this lemma in 
some  of  the  following  proofs.  One  implication  of  this  lemma  is  that  since 
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Extremely low linking costs 
 
Proposition  1  shows  that  when  the  linking  costs  are  extremely  low,  the  complete 
network will emerge both as the predicted outcome and as the favorable outcome. 
This result is very common in network formation models with positive externalities 
and it is independent of the preferences of both types of agents (the ordering of the 
values of the intrinsic value function). We might interpret this result as showing that 
when the linking costs are very low, the social structure does not reflect the social 
heterogeneity. 
 
Proposition 1: If ( ) c w > − min
2 δ δ  the complete network is the unique pairwise stable 
network and the unique efficient network. 
 
Low linking costs 
 
These costs are high enough for a direct connection between type b agents not to be 
worthwhile if the pair have an alternative length two path between them. However, 
these costs are low enough for a direct connection between a type b agent and a type a 
agent to be worthwhile even if they have a length two path between them. Proposition 
2 shows that, in this case, both the predicted and the socially favorable outcome is the 
maximally  connected  core-periphery  network  in  which  type  b  agents  drop  their 
internal direct connections. Thus, the strength of type a agents is reflected in their 
social position, since they are both highly connected and serve as bridges for the type 
b agents.  
                                                  
20 In the homogeneous connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), this implication can extend 
the results stated above since it establishes that empty network is the unique pairwise stable network in 








δ δ ). If there is another pairwise stable network in this 
range,  its  total  value  should  be  non-negative  since  each  of  the  agents  have  non-negative  utility. 
However, the empty network is the unique efficient network, meaning, there is no other network with 
non-negative total utility – contradiction.       13
 
Proposition  2:  If    ( ) ( ) 3
2
2
2 w c w δ δ δ δ − > > −   the  maximally  connected  core-
periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery 





To analyze the probable and favorable network structures when the linking costs are 
higher than  ( ) 2
2 w δ δ −  we will add one assumption regarding the preferences of the 
type a agents and one assumption regarding the preferences of the type b agents.  
To demonstrate the need for these additional assumptions assume that agent i have a 
shortest path of length l>1 both to a type a agent and to a type b agent. Moreover, 
assume that shortening the path to these agents does not shorten any other connection 
that agent i possesses. The preferences of agent i suggest that she will prefer to form a 
direct link with the type a agent over forming a direct link with the type b agent. 
However, if initially her path to the type b agent was longer than her path to the type a 
agent, her preferences regarding the direct links formation are unclear. The two new 
assumptions  are  introduced  in  order  to  extend  the  description  of  the  agent's 
preferences to include some of these cases.  
 
Assumption 1: ( ) 2 1
2 w w δ δ δ > − . 
Assumption 2: ( ) ( ) 3
3
2
2 w w δ δ δ δ − > − . 
 
The first assumption states that type a agent prefers to connect directly to another type 
a agent to whom she otherwise has a path of length two over connecting directly to a 
type b agent to whom she otherwise has no path at all. The second assumption is 
somewhat weaker and it states that type b agent prefers to connect directly to type a 
agent to whom she otherwise has a path of length two over connecting directly to a 
type b agent to whom she otherwise has a path of length three
21. It is important to note 
                                                  








iw w δ δ .  Thus,  a  type  a  agent  prefers  to  connect  directly  to  a  type  a  agent  to  whom  she 
otherwise have no path at all over connecting directly to a type b agent which is positioned at the 
beginning of an infinite line of type b agents to none of whom she otherwise has any path at all. Similar   14
that these interpretations to the assumptions refer only to situations in which forming 
the link does not yield any shortening of paths to agents other than the agent with 
whom the link is formed. 
Mathematically, these assumptions restrict the eligible values for the intrinsic values 
function  and  for  the  depreciation  rate  parameter,  beyond  the  previous  restrictions 
( 3 2 1 w w w > >  and  1 0 < < δ ). One approach is to interpret the assumptions as an 
introduction of an effective upper bound to the depreciation rate parameter. It is trivial 
to  see  that  for  both  assumptions  to  hold  simultaneously,  the  depreciation  rate 

















22.  Another  approach  is  to 
interpret  these  assumptions  as  a  construction  of  lower  bounds  to  the  cardinal 
difference (or ratio) between the agents' utility from a direct connection with a type a 
agent and her utility from a direct connection with a type b agent. The small lower 
bound set for type b  agents compared to the one set  for type a agents, might be 
interpreted  as  an  addition  of  a  second-order  homophily  effect.  Under  this 
interpretation, type a agents are attracted to other type a agents both because of their 
exogenous power and their mutual similarity. However, type b agents are attracted to 
type a agents despite the offsetting effect of their differences. 
Stronger version of assumption 2, which is symmetric to assumption 1, states that 
type b agent prefers to connect directly to type a agent to whom she otherwise has a 
path of length two over connecting directly to a type b agent to whom she otherwise 
has no path at all. 
 
Assumption 2*: ( ) 3 2
2 w w δ δ δ > − . 
 
                                                                                                                                             
interpretation to the second assumption arises from writing the inequality as  ( ) 3
2
2 w w δ δ δ + > . Thus, a 
type b agent prefers to connect directly to a type a agent to whom she otherwise has no path at all over 
connecting directly to a connected pair of type b agents to whom she otherwise has no path.  









< . An increase 
in  2 w  causes with type a agents to be relatively less attractive for type a agents and relatively more 
attractive for type b agents. Therefore, given  1 w  and  3 w , an increase in  2 w  turns the first assumption 
to  be  the  effective  restriction.  Note  that  the  upper  bound  can  be  almost  as  low  as  zero  (if  either 
















= ) which is strictly 
lower than unity.        15
It is again trivial to see that for assumptions 1 and 2* to hold simultaneously, the 


































Medium linking costs 
 
Proposition 3 analyses the linking costs range in which a direct connection between 
type a and a type b agents is not worthwhile if they have a length two path between 
them, but it is worthwhile if this link is the only path between them. This proposition 
asserts that under the assumptions above, the socially favorable outcome is the one 
gate minimally connected core periphery network in which the core contains all the 
type a agents while the periphery contains all the type b agents. However, the set of 
possible networks is much larger and includes two structures of networks. First, all the 
minimally connected core periphery networks in which the core contains all the type a 
agents  while  the  periphery  contains  all  the  type  b  agents  (therefore  the  favorable 
networks are also possible). Second, some of the connected networks in which the 
type a agents form a complete clique and there is at least one type b agent who is not 
connected directly to a type a agent.  
 
Proposition 3: If  ( ) 2
2
2 w c w δ δ δ − > >  and assumption 1 and 2 hold: 
1.  Every minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core agents 
are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable. 
2.  The set of pairwise stable networks includes also some connected networks in 
which all type a agents are directly connected to each other and there is at least 
one type b agent who is not directly linked to any type a agent.  
3.  The one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core 
agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is uniquely efficient.  
 
                                                  










>  and therefore the interval of values for which the effective restriction is the 
second assumption is wider. Note that the upper bound can be almost as low as low as zero (if either 





−  (if  3 1 2 w w w = ).    16
The first part of the proof establishes that in the medium linking costs range, the 
behavior of agents of any minimally connected core-periphery network in which all 
core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b follows the following 
rules:  
•  No pair of core agents wants to severe their link due to assumption 1. 
•  No pair of periphery agents likes to form a link due to assumption 2. 
•  Core  agents  maintain  their  links  with  their  own  periphery  agents  since 
otherwise they will have no access to them. 
•  Core agents do not form a link to other periphery agents both since they can 
access  them  through  other  core  agents  and  since  they  do  not  provide  any 
additional value.    
In  this  architecture,  type  a  agents  consider  other  type  a  agents  attractive  for  two 
reasons - the high intrinsic value of their connection and the access to their periphery 
agents. As the size of the periphery of the type a agent decreases he becomes less 
attractive to his fellow type a agents. Assumption 1 guarantees that even the least 
valuable  type  a  agent,  one  who  has  no  periphery  agents  of  his  own,  will  still  be 
attractive to other type a agents
24.  
A pair of periphery agents either shares the same core agent or not. If they share a 
core agent the value of their connection is  3
2w δ  while if they have different core 
agents the value is only  3
3w δ . Obviously, the later pair has stronger incentive to form 
a direct link. Hence, we need assumption 2 to ensure that a pair of type b agents that 
have different core agents does not wish to form a direct link. Note, however, that 
one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of 
type a and all periphery agents are of type b, will remain pairwise stable even if 
assumption 2 is dropped since all the periphery agents in this network share the same 
core agent.    
The second part of the  proof characterizes the  non core periphery pairwise stable 
networks as connected networks in which all type a agents are directly connected and 
there is at least one type b agent who is not directly linked to any type a agent. Under 
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 
 + −  narrows the set of pairwise 
stable core periphery networks to be the set of minimally connected core periphery networks in which 






N .  Note that 
this discussion is relevant only for  3 ≥ k . When there are one or two type a agents assumption 1 is not 
needed.   17
certain conditions, that satisfy the costs range and assumptions 1 and 2 (but not 2*), 
the non core periphery network in figure 3A is pairwise stable. If assumption 2 is 
replaced by the stricter assumption 2*, we can further establish that the type b agents 
who are not directly linked to any type a agent have to posses at least two links. 
Under certain conditions, that satisfy the costs range and assumptions 1 and 2* (and 




     




The  third  part  of  the  proof  shows  that  the  one-gate  minimally  connected  core-
periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are 
of type b is uniquely efficient. The short distance between the type b agents provides 
the  intuition  for  the  efficiency  of  the  one-gate  network  in  comparison  to  other 
minimally  connected  core  periphery  networks.  The  one  gate  network  could  be 
considered as a mixture of a complete network of the type a agents and a star network 
of the type b agents (centered by a type a agent). The efficiency of this mixture is not 
surprising considering proposition 1 of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Note that this 
part of the proof does not use assumption 2 (assumption 1 is needed for the efficiency 
of the type a agents' organization). However, the one gate network is not efficient in 
the Paretian sense since the gate agent is better off in any other minimally connected 
core periphery network, since a direct connection between type a and a type b agents 
is not worthwhile if they have a length two path between them.  
Proposition  3  exhibits  the  first  case  of  tension  between  probable  and  favorable 
networks.  Although  this  tension  can  be  mitigated  by  a  central  planner,  since  the 
favorable network is also probable, it demonstrates clearly two distinct sources of 
inefficiency.  One  source  of  inefficiency  is  non  optimal  positioning,  meaning  that 
some agents have "wrong" friends. The other source of inefficiency is non optimal 
connectivity, meaning that some agents have "too many" friends. The first source is 
demonstrated  by  the  stable  and  inefficient  minimally  connected  core  periphery 
networks.  In  these  networks  the  inefficiency  is  a  result  of  lack  of  coordination 
Figure  3A:  non  core  periphery  network 
which  is  pairwise  stable  under  certain 
conditions that satisfy assumptions 1 and 
2 (not 2*). (black – type a, white – type b). 
Figure 3B: non core periphery network 
which  is  pairwise  stable  under  certain 
conditions that satisfy assumptions 1 and 
2* (and therefore also 2). (black – type a, 
white – type b).   18
between agents in designating the gate agent. The second source of inefficiency is 
best demonstrated by the set of non core periphery networks under assumptions 1 and 
2*. First note that efficient network has  ( )
2
1 − k k
 internal core links and l links in 
which the type b agents are involved (their links to the gate). The number of links in 
the non core periphery stable networks is strictly higher since they have the same 
number of internal core links but more than l links in which type b agents are involved 
because agents who are not connected to the core cannot be "loose ends". Thus, in 
these stable networks another source of inefficiency is non optimal connectivity, the 
agents are over-connected
25.             
 
                                                  
25 Under assumption 2, not all of these networks are over connected, see figure 3A.   19
Additional definition 
 
An  additional  definition  is  needed  before  analyzing  the  structures  emerging  in 
environments  with  higher  levels  of  linking  costs  ( 2 w c δ > ).  Let  g  be  a  one  gate 
minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a 
and all periphery agents are of type b and let  g′ be the disconnected core-periphery 
network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. 
Note that the number of links in g is the number of links in  g′ plus the number of 
type b agents (l). Thus, the number of additional payments for direct connections in g, 
relative to  g′ is 2l. Denote by Q the additional utility from g per additional payment - 
( ) ( )
c
l
w k w w Q −
−







2 δ δ δ .  
Intuitively, Q is the net social return from connecting all type b agents into the central 
component  of  the  network.  If  0 > Q   it  is  beneficial  for  the  whole  society  to 
incorporate the weak agents into the central component and otherwise it is not
26. This 
social consideration is not in direct accordance with the individual preferences of the 
agents  over  the  formation  of  these  links.  Therefore,  Q  will  serve  as  useful 
methodological tool in analyzing the tension between stability and efficiency that will 
arise in the following results. Moreover, Q is an increasing function of the network 
size and therefore this characteristic of the network, which had almost no role in the 
lower linking costs, is expected to have a direct effect on the range of linking costs in 
which the stability-efficiency tension exists
27.  
 
High linking costs 
 
Proposition 4 analyses the linking costs range in which a direct connection between 
type a and a type b agents is not worthwhile even if this link is the only path between 
them while a direct connection between a pair of type a agents is worthwhile even if 
otherwise they have a path of length two between them. Assumption 1 guarantees that 
this range exists. It should also be noted that if  3 ≥ n  this range surely contains an 
interval in which  0 > Q  but it may also contain a higher interval in which  0 < Q .  
                                                  
26 This consideration was irrelevant for smaller linking costs since  c w Q − > 2 δ  and therefore always 
positive. Thus, it was always beneficial to incorporate the weak agents into the society. 
27 The size of the network had similar effect in the high linking costs range of the homogeneous model. 
See propositions 1.2 and 2.4 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).   20
The  proposition  shows  that  the  characterization  of  the  favorable  and  probable 
networks  depend  heavily  on  the  value  of  Q.  If  0 < Q   (proposition  4.1)  the 
disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all 
periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable network and the unique 
efficient  network.  Thus,  when  0 < Q   there  is  no  tension  between  stability  and 
efficiency. However, if  0 > Q  (proposition 4.2) the tension exists and it cannot be 
mitigated by a central planner. The socially favorable outcome in this case is, as in the 
medium  linking  costs  range,  the  one  gate  minimally  connected  core  periphery 
network in which the core contains all the type a agents while the periphery contains 
all the type b agents. The set of probable networks, on the other hand, includes the 
disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all 
periphery agents are of type b and some other, non core-periphery networks. This 
result, that the favorable network is not probable, resembles the one found by Jackson 








c .  
 
Proposition  4.1:  If  ( ) 2 1
2 w c w δ δ δ > > − ,  0 < Q   and  assumption  1  holds,  the 
disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all 
periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable network and the unique 
efficient network. 
 
Proposition 4.2: If ( ) 2 1
2 w c w δ δ δ > > − ,  0 > Q  and assumption 1 holds: 
1.  The disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type 
a and all periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable. 
2.  The  other  members  of  the  set  of  pairwise  stable  networks  are  non  core 
periphery networks in which all type a agents are directly connected to each 
other and every type b agent is either isolated or possesses at least two links
28.  
3.  The one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core 
agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is uniquely efficient.  
 
                                                  
28  A conjecture we fail to prove or refute is that if assumption 2 holds then the disconnected core-
periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is the 
unique pairwise stable network. Note that besides this conjecture, assumption 2 is unneeded to get the 
results stated in proposition 4.    21
Proposition  4  is  divided  only  for  presentational  convenience,  the  proofs  of  these 
propositions are combined and relegated to the appendix.  
The first part of the proof shows that when the linking costs are high, type a agents in 
the disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all 
periphery agents are of type b, do not wish to severe their links with each other but are 
not willing to form links with the completely isolated type b agents. The reluctance of 
type a agents to form links with type b agents does not stem only from the low value 
they give to this kind of direct connection, but also from the fact that the type b agents 
do  not  provide  any  "extra"  value  of  short  paths  to  third  parties.  However,  this 
additional requirement of "extra" value is not demanded when a link between two 
type a agents is considered, since this link bears a high enough intrinsic value to 
overcome the linking costs.        
The second part of the proof shows the efficiency of the disconnected core-periphery 
network (proposition 4.1) and the one-gate core periphery network (proposition 4.2). 
The proof technique is very similar to the efficiency proof of proposition 3. However, 
the differences are due to the behavior of the type a agents who no longer wish to 
form links with isolated type b agents, and therefore the possibility of an efficient 
network  which  is  not  connected.  The  final  step  of  this  part  was  to  use  Q  to 
characterize the cases in which the disconnected core-periphery network has higher 
total utility than the one-gate core periphery network and vice versa.     
The third part of the proof completes proposition 4.1 by establishing the uniqueness of 
the disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all 
periphery agents are of type b. Briefly, we show that every pairwise stable network 
have to contain a complete clique of all type a agents. Thus, any other pairwise stable 
network  must  have  additional  links  relative  to  the  disconnected  core-periphery 
network. By lemma 1 its total utility should be higher, contradicting the efficiency 
result.  
The last part of the proof characterize, for the case of  0 > Q , the set of pairwise stable 
networks other than the disconnected core periphery network. It is easily shown that 
these networks are non core periphery networks in which all type a agents are directly 
connected to each other and every type b agent is either isolated or possesses at least 
two links. We show that under values that do not satisfy assumption 2, the first case 
can be demonstrated by a network with two connected type a agents and a separate 
circle of eleven type b agents while the second case can be demonstrated by network 
pictured in figure 4.   22
     
 







The main characteristic of this range is that the linking costs are too high for any type 
a agent to invest in a connection with an otherwise isolated type b agent. Obviously, if 
this investment is too high for a type a agent, it is also too high for a type b agent. 
Therefore,  all  the  probable  networks  have  either  isolated  type  b  agents  or  type  b 
agents that are directly connected to at least two different agents.  
The additional utility per additional payment, denoted by Q, is a general measure that 
has an interesting role in the results of proposition 4. While it is trivial, by definition, 
that its sign sets the efficient network, it is rather surprising that its sign also have 
some relation to individual incentives since it distinguish between parameter values 
for which there are pairwise stable non disconnected core periphery networks and 
cases in which the disconnected core periphery network is the unique stable network.   
As a result, Q serves as indicator to the tension between favorable and stable networks 
which exists only if  0 > Q . However, the tension in this case is worth than in all 
previous cases since the favorable one gate core periphery network is not stable since 
its type b agents are not attractive enough for the potential gate agent. As mentioned 
above, this result resembles the one found by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in the 








c .   
 
Extremely high linking costs 
 
Proposition 5 analyses the linking costs range in which a direct connection between a 
pair of type a agents is not worthwhile if they have an alternative path of length two 
between them. The proposition shows that in this range, if assumption 1 holds, core 
periphery networks are neither pairwise stable nor efficient. The basic intuition behind 
this result is that in this linking costs range, the clique architecture is too costly for the 
Figure 4: non core periphery network which is 
pairwise stable under certain conditions that do 
not satisfy assumption 2. Every type b agent has 
at least two links (black – type a, white – type b).   23
type a agents. Indeed, although it would not be proven here due to lack of interest, 
various architectures that feature a star for the type a agents emerge as pairwise stable 
and efficient in this range of linking costs.  
 
Proposition 5: If  ( ) 1
2 w c δ δ − > ,  3 ≥ k  and assumption 1 holds, no core periphery 
network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of 
type b is either pairwise stable or efficient. 
 
The instability result is fairly obvious. Already, in proposition 4 we saw that if the 
linking costs are too high for a type a agent to connect to an otherwise isolated type b 
agent, the disconnected core periphery network in which all the core agents are of 
type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is the only core periphery candidate 
for pairwise stability. In the present level of linking costs, this network is not stable 
since it is too high for the a type a agent to maintain connections to all the other 
agents considering he has an alternative path of length two to each of them if  3 ≥ k .   
Note that assumption 1 is crucial for the correctness of this part of the proposition. If 
it does not hold and  2 w c δ > , pairwise stable core periphery networks might emerge 
(numerical example is provided in the proof). The intuition is that the linking costs do 
not prevent type a agents from connecting to an otherwise isolated type b agents. By 
maintaining this kind of connections the type a agents become more attractive to other 
type  a  agents  since  a  link  with  them  provides  additional  shorter  paths  to  their 
peripheral  type  b  agents.  If  all  the  type  a  agents  increase  their  attractiveness  by 
connecting to otherwise isolated type b agents, it might be worthwhile for all the 
internal connections in the core to be kept and stability to be achieved.   
In order to show that core periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a 
and all the periphery agents are of type b are inefficient, we began by showing that an 
efficient core-periphery network should minimize the paths between peripheral type b 
agents. Then any network in which there was a type b agent with more than one link 
was  shown  to  be  inefficient.  The  last  step  was  to  show  that  the  rest  of  the  core 
periphery networks, where all the non isolated periphery agents are linked to the same 
type a agent (the gate) are inefficient. Indeed, a non core periphery architecture in 
which all the type a agents and the non isolated type b agents are organized as a star 
around the gate is shown to have higher total utility. Note that assumption 1 was not 
needed for this part of the proof.     24
4 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we introduced the heterogenuous connections model in which there are 
two types of agents whose their benefit from their connections to other agents depends 
on their geodesic distance and on their types. The dependence of the benefit on the 
types is modeled using a discrete, positive and symmetric intrinsic value function that 
multiply the original depreciation factor of the homogeneous connections model of 
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). 
In  the  case  analyzed  here  both  types  have  the  same  ordinal  preferences  over 
connections, holding the path length constant and provided that no indirect benefits 
are incurred due to shortening paths to other agents. This setting is interpreted as a 
"power based" society, where the powerful type is the type preferred by both agents.    
We show that in this simple framework, the dominant architecture when linking costs 
are not too low and not too high is the core periphery architecture where the powerful 
type agents are positioned in the completely connected core while the other type is 
peripheral  and  is  completely  disconnected  internally.  Various  versions  of  this 
architecture  appear  as  pairwise  stable  networks  (in  some  cases  the  unique  stable 
network) and as efficient networks (always unique). 
We  suggest  heterogeneity  and  "power  indicating  preferences"  as  an  alternative 
explanation  for  the  circumstances  under  which  a  core  periphery  network  might 
emerge. Thus, after the formation of the network, the core agents have two distinct 
sources of power. The first source is the high intrinsic value that all the members of 
the society have from connecting to them. This power is exogenous and independent 
of the network formation process. The second source of power is the central position 
of the preferred type in the social network. This secondary power which is easily 
observed through the network structure is both the manifestation of the original power 
and its perpetuator.   
The framework used in this paper, and specifically the intrinsic value function enables 
the  analysis  of  two  other  types  of  heterogenuous  social  preferences.  While  we 
assumed  3 2 1 w w w > >   to  characterize  the  "power  based"  society,  assuming  that 
2 3 1, w w w >  might be interpreted as a "homophilic" society in which both types of 
agents prefer to connect to their own type over connecting to the other type. Assuming 
3 1 2 ,w w w >  might be interpreted as a "heterophilic" society in which both types of 
agents prefer to connect to the other type over connecting to their own type.     25
It is intuitive to predict that the dominant structure in the "homophilic" society is the 
segregated  network  in  which  there  are  two  cohesive  groups  densely  connected 
internally, one of type a agents and the other of type b agents
29. However, it seems 
that it takes very high linking costs in order to achieve complete segregation, meaning 
that  the  two  groups  form  two  separate  components,  since  the  benefit  from  a 
connection between these groups is huge
30. This result is consistent, obviously, with 
Burt (1992) identification of structural holes and the massive gains that they carry. 
These basic intuitions are backed by an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence 
that was  gathered regarding the dominance of  segregated networks in  which each 
component is internally homogeneous under homophilic social preferences
31.  
It is also intuitive to predict that the dominant structure in the "heterophilic" society is 
the  bipartite  network  which  consists  of  two  cohesive  groups  sparsely  connected 
internally  and  densely  connected  externally
32.  One  observation  is  that  the  lack  of 
internal connections will lead to high average degree in this environment
33. The main 
line  of  research  that  analyses  bipartite  structures  is  the  analysis  of  matching 
procedures, which is fairly different from the formation literature by its mechanistic 
approach and the lack of network perspective in the agents' utilities. It seems that the 
empirical  literature  regarding  the  network  perspective  of  bipartite  structures  and 
heterophily barely exists
34.  
We will conclude with the observation that compared with core periphery networks in 
the empirical literature, the networks that emerged in this analysis were "too neat". 
Moreover, the change in the stable architecture during an increase of the linking costs 
wasn't continuous. However, we believe that this is due to the simplicity of the model 
                                                  
29 Informally, it seems that the internal structure of each of the cohesive groups is either a complete 
network or a star, depending on the linking costs, as predicted in the homogeneous model of Jackson 
and Wolinsky (1996). 
30 Similar intuition can be deduced from proposition 2 of Jackson and Rogers (2005). 
31 For representative results regarding homophily in social networks see Precker (1952), Gurevitch 
(1961), Travers and Milgram (1969), White et. al. (1976), Verbrugge (1977), Brieger and Ennis (1979), 
Frank  (1995)  and  McPherson  et.  al.  (2001).  There  is  also  a  vast  theoretical  literature  concerning 
segregation, in particular due to the tendencies towards economic  segregation in both the  US and 
Europe since the 1970's (i.e. Miyao (1978), Benabou (1993, 1996a, 1996b), Durlauf (1996)). 
32  Some cases of the coauthor model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) generate bipartite networks as an 
efficient (yet not stable) outcomes. However, these networks are not densely connected between the 
two sets of agents. 
33 Let agent i be a type a agent and let agent j be a type b agent. If they are not directly connected, they 
will probably have only a path of length three between them since most of i's neighbors will be type b 
agents who are sparsely connected to agent j, and the same for agent j. Thus, the net gain from direct 
connection is higher in this framework and therefore a high average degree is predicted.  
34  Krackhardt  and  Hanson  (1993)  mention  segregation,  core-periphery  and  bipartite  structures  as 
undesirable  architectures  of  organizational  networks.  However  they  do  not  discuss  the  normative 
causes for the formation of these architectures.    26
and introducing more complex mathematical objects as non linear linking costs or 
secondary  stochastic  formation  processes  will  yield  these  deviations  with  no 
substantial important lessons about the formation behavior of the agents.     27
Appendix   
 
Proof of lemma 1  
 
We will show that if g is pairwise stable then for each pair of agents i and k, such that  g ik ∈ , it must 
be that  ( ) 0 , , ≥ g k i TRC . Assume that g is pairwise stable and that there is a pair of agents i and k, 
such that  g ik ∈  and  ( ) 0 , , < g k i TRC . Let  ( ) g i N l ,
~
∈ . First, if  ( ) 0 2 =
k
il s  then none of the 
shortest paths between agent i and agent l in g pass through agent k. Thus,  ( ) ( ) ik g l i S g l i S − = , , , ,  
and  ( ) ) , , , ( ) , , , ( , g j l i RC ik g j l i RC : ik g i N j = − − ∈ ∀ . Second, if  ( ) il
k
il s s = 2  then all the 
shortest paths between agent i and agent l in g pass through agent k. In network g-ik, agent i and agent l 
are  either  connected  or  disconnected.  If  they  are  disconnected  then 
( ) 0 ) , , , ( ) , , , ( , = = − − ∈ ∀ g j l i RC ik g j l i RC : ik g i N j .  If  they  are  connected  then 
( ) 0 ) , , , ( ) , , , ( : , = > − − ∈ ∃ g j l i RC ik g j l i RC ik g i N j   and  there  might  be  other  neighbors 
such  that  0 ) , , , ( ) , , , ( = = − g j l i RC ik g j l i RC .  Last,  if  ( ) 0 2 > >
k
il il s s   then  some  of  the 
shortest paths between agent i and agent l pass through agent k and others through other neighbors. Let 
agent  1 m  be one of those neighbors. In g-ik,  ) 2 (
1 m
il s  is the same as in g and  il s  decreases and 
therefore  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 1 1 g m l i RC ik g m l i RC > − . Let agent  2 m  be one of the neighbors through 
which no shortest path between agent i and agent l go (such agent not necessarily exists). Hence, 
0 ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 2 = = − g m l i RC ik g m l i RC . Thus, when the link between agent i and agent k is 
severed, the relative contributions of i's other neighbors are non-decreasing and by the definition of 
total  relative  contribution,  stated  above,  it  is  clear  that 




( ) ∑ ∑
− ∈ ∈
− ≤
ik g i N j k g i N j
ik g j i TRC g j i TRC
, \ ,




( ) ∑ ∑
− ∈ ∈
− <
ik g i N j g i N j
ik g j i TRC g j i TRC
, ,
, , , , .  However,  this  means  that  ( ) ( ) ik g u g u i i − < . 
Therefore, it is beneficial for agent i to drop his link to agent k and therefore g is not pairwise stable. 
Contradiction. Thus, if g is pairwise stable then for each pair of agents i and k, such that  g ik ∈ , 
( ) 0 , , ≥ g k i TRC . 
 
Proof of proposition 1  
 
To show that the complete network is pairwise stable first consider the case of  2 > n . The net gains of 
agent  i  from  keeping  the  direct  connection  ij  are  at  least  min
2
min w c w δ δ − − .  Since 
( ) c w > − min
2 δ δ , the net gains are positive and both agents will keep the link. In the case of  2 = n , 
both agents are completely isolated after severing ij and therefore their net gains from keeping the link 
are at least  c w − min δ . Since  c w > min δ , the net gains are again positive and both agents will keep 
the link. Thus, the complete network is pairwise stable. To prove that the complete network is the 
unique stable network, assume that there is another stable network,  g′. There is at least one pair of 
agents that are not directly linked in  g′. Assume that a path of length two links them. As shown above, 
their  net  gains  from  connecting  directly,  whatever  are  their  types,  are  positive  and  therefore  this 
network is not stable. Obviously, if a longer path links them (as in the case of  2 = n ), they will also 
prefer to connect directly. Thus, the unique stable network is the complete network. To prove that the 
complete network is the unique efficient network, first consider the case of  2 > n  and let  g′ be a 
non-complete network. There exists in  g′ a pair of agents i and j which are not directly connected. 
Consider the network  ij g g + ′ = ′ ′ . The minimal difference in total utility between the two networks   28
is achieved when every other agent  j i h , ≠  have the same utility in  g ′ ′  as in  g′
35 , the two agents 
are only two links away in  g′ and when the internal value of their connection is the lowest possible 
one. Thus, the minimal difference in total utility is  ( ) min
2
min 2 w c w δ δ − − . As shown above, this 
difference is positive and therefore  g′ is not efficient. If  2 = n  the only non-complete network is the 
empty  network,  in  which  the  total  utility  is  zero.  Thus,  the  difference  in  total  utility  between  the 
complete  network  and  the  empty  network  is  at  least  ( ) c w − min 2 δ   and  as  showed  above  this 
difference is positive. In conclusion, for any non-complete network  g′ in which agents i and j are not 
directly connected, the  network  ij g g + ′ = ′ ′  has higher total utility. Thus, the complete  network 
achieves the highest total utility and therefore it is strongly and uniquely efficient. 
 
Proof of proposition 2  
 
Let g be the "maximally connected" core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a 
and all the periphery agents are of type b. We will prove that g is pairwise stable by showing that no 
pair of periphery agents wishes to form a direct link, no core agent wishes to severe her direct links to 
either the core or the periphery agents and no periphery agent wishes to severe her direct links to the 
core agents. In order to show that no pair of periphery agents wish to form a direct link, note that these 
agents are of type b and that their utility from g is  ( ) ( ) 3
2
2 1 w l c w k δ δ − + − . If there is more than 
one periphery agent (otherwise this case is irrelevant), the utility of a periphery agent i in  ij g +  where 
j is a periphery agent is  ( ) ( ) ( ) c w w l c w k − + − + − 3 3
2
2 2 δ δ δ . Thus, since  ( ) 3
2 w c δ δ − > , no 
periphery agent in g wishes to form a direct link with another periphery agent. In order to show that no 
core agent wishes to severe a direct link with another core agent, note that these agents are of type a 
and that their utility in g is  ( )( ) ( ) c w l c w k − + − − 2 1 1 δ δ . If there are more than one core agent 
(otherwise this case is irrelevant), the utility of a core agent i in  ij g −  where j is a core agent is 
( )( ) ( ) c w l w c w k − + + − − 2 1
2
1 2 δ δ δ  as they will have a path of length two through a third party 
(either core agent or periphery agent). Thus, the link would be kept since ( ) c w > − 1
2 δ δ . In order to 
show that no core agent wishes to severe a direct link with a periphery agent consider first the case in 
which there is more than one core agent. If a core agent i decides to sever a direct link with a periphery 
agent j, it has no effect on the length of her paths to the rest of the agents in  ij g − . The new path to 
agent j will be of length two (through another core agent). The utility of the core agent in  ij g −  is 
( )( ) ( )( ) 2
2
2 1 1 1 w c w l c w k δ δ δ + − − + − −  and she will keep the link since  ( ) c w > − 2
2 δ δ . If 
there  is  only  one  core  agent,  her  utility  from  g  is  ( ) c w l − 2 δ   while  her  utility  from  ij g −   is 
( )( ) c w l − − 2 1 δ  and she will keep the link since  c w > 2 δ . In order to show that no periphery agent 
wishes to severe a direct link with a core agent consider first the case in which there are more than one 
core agent. If a periphery agent i decides to sever a direct link with a core agent j, it has no effect on the 
length of her paths to the rest of the agents in  ij g − . The new path to agent j will be of length two 
since  (through  another  core  agent).  The  utility  of  the  periphery  agent  from  ij g −   is 




2 1 1 w l w c w k δ δ δ − + + − −  and she will keep the link since ( ) c w > − 2
2 δ δ . If there 
is only one core agent, the utility of a periphery agent from g is  ( ) ( ) 3
2
2 1 w l c w δ δ − + −  while her 
utility  from  ij g −   is  zero.  Since  ( ) c w w l w > ≥ − + 2 3
2
2 1 δ δ δ ,  she  will  keep  the  link.  In 
conclusion, we showed that g, the maximally connected core-periphery network in which all the core 
agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable. To prove that this 
                                                  
35  Note that in the connections model the externality of two players connecting on the other members 
of the network is non-negative. The new link might not change any shortest paths in the network 
(except of the one between the two connecting agents) or replace certain paths by shorter paths. In both 
cases, the utility of the members of the network, apart from the two that establish the new link, is non-
decreasing. Deleting a link, on the other hand, might harm agents that are not involved directly in the 
severed link since it might lengthen some of their shortest paths. Thus, if two agents wish to add a link 
it will surely increase the total utility of the network, while if an agent whishes to severe a link it 
improves her utility but might harm total utility.   29
network is the unique pairwise stable network we will first show that in any pairwise stable network all 
the pairs of type a agents are directly connected. Let  g′ be a pairwise stable network in which there is 
a pair of type a agents who are not directly connected (if there is only one type a agent this case is 
irrelevant). Their minimal gain from linking is achieved if a path of length two links them and if this 
direct link does not shorten any of their paths to other agents. Thus, their gains from the direct link are 
at least  0 1
2
1 > − − w c w δ δ . Obviously, if a longer path links them and/or this link shortens their 
paths to other agents, they will surely gain even more from a direct link and therefore  g′ is not stable, 
contradiction. Now we will show that in any pairwise stable network all the pairs of type a agent and 
type b agent are directly connected. Let  g ′ ′  be a pairwise stable network in which there is a pair of 
type a agent and type b agent who are not directly connected while all the pairs of type a agents are 
directly connected. Their minimal gain from linking is achieved if a path of length two links them and 
if this direct link does not shorten any of their paths to other agents. Thus, their gains from this direct 
link are at least  0 2
2
2 > − − w c w δ δ . Obviously, if a longer path links them and/or this link shortens 
their paths to other agents, they will gain even more from a direct link and therefore  g ′ ′  is not pairwise 
stable, contradiction. So far we have shown that every pairwise stable network has at least all the edges 
of the maximally connected core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a and all 
the periphery agents are of type b. If there is only one type b agent there are no other networks with 
these edges (in fact it is the complete network) and it is the unique pairwise stable network. If there is 
more than one type b agent, we will show that every network which has these links but also some more 
links between type b agents is not pairwise stable. Let  g ′ ′ ′  be a stable network in which every pair of 
type a agents are directly connected and every pair of type a agent and type b agent are directly 
connected and there is at least one pair of type b agents which are directly connected. In  g ′ ′ ′  the path 
length between two type b agents is two if they are not directly connected or one if they are directly 
connected. Moreover, severing a direct link between two type b agents i and j will not affect the paths 
between those two agents and other agents in the network. Thus, the net utility gains of each type b 
agent's utility from severing the direct link to another type b agent are  ( ) c w w − − 3 3
2 δ δ . Since 
( ) 3
2 w c δ δ − >  she would wish to severe her direct link to the other type b agent and therefore  g ′ ′ ′  
is not pairwise stable, contradiction. Therefore, the maximally connected core-periphery network in 
which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise 
stable network. To prove that this network is the unique efficient network, let  g be a network in which 
there exist a pair of agents i and j, at least one of them is a type a agent, which are not linked. Consider 
the  network ij g g + = ′ .  Remember  that  the  externality  of  two  players  connecting  on  the  other 
members of the network is non-negative and therefore if both agents i and j wish to link directly to each 
other the total utility of  g′ must be higher than the total utility of g. We showed above that two type a 
agents always wish to connect directly and so do a pair of type a agent and type b agent. Thus, the 
efficient network belongs to the set of networks in which type a agents are completely connected while 
type b agents are connected to all type a agents and maybe to some of the other type b agents. In these 
networks, the shortest path from a type a agent to any other agent is of length one, and the shortest path 
between two type b agents is one if they are directly connected and two otherwise. Thus, severing a 
link between two type b agents harms the utility of none of the agents that are not involved in the link. 
Since ( ) c w < − 3
2 δ δ  any pair of type b agents increase total utility by severing the link. Hence, the 
highest  utility  will be achieved if there  will be  no links  between type b agents. Thus, the  unique 
efficient network is the maximally connected core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of 
type a and all the periphery agents are of type b. 
 
Proof of proposition 3 
 
Let g be a member of the set of minimally connected core-periphery networks in which all core agents 
are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. In order to show that g is pairwise stable we have to 
verify four conditions: no pair of periphery agents would like to connect, no pair of core agent and 
periphery agent which is connected to another core agent would like to connect, no pair of core agent 
and one of her periphery agents would like to severe their direct link and no pair of core agents would 
like to severe their direct links. First, we will show that no pair of periphery agents would like to form a 
link (if there is only one periphery agent this case is irrelevant). Note that there are two kinds of pairs 
of periphery agents – a pair in which both agents are connected to the same core agent and a pair in 
which the agents are connected to different core agents. Consider the case in which both periphery   30
agents are connected to the same core agent. If these two periphery agents form a link, it reduces the 
distance between them but does not get them closer to any other agent. By forming this link, each of 
these agents gains a net utility of  3
2
3 w c w δ δ − − . Thus, since  ( ) ( ) 3
2
2
2 w w c δ δ δ δ − > − >  this 
pair of agents would not wish to connect directly. Now, consider the case in which the two periphery 
agents are connected to different core agents (if there is only one core agent this case is irrelevant). If 
these two periphery agents form a link, it reduces only the distance between them. By forming this link, 
each  of  these  periphery  agents  has  a  net  utility  of  3
3
3 w c w δ δ − − .  Thus,  using  assumption  2, 
( ) ( ) 3
3
2
2 w w c δ δ δ δ − > − >  and this pair of agents would not wish to connect directly. Second, 
we will show that no pair of core agent  ( ) 1 j  and periphery agent  ( ) i  who is linked to another core 
agent  ( ) 2 j  would like to form a direct link. If i links to  1 j , i shortens her path to  1 j  and to her 
periphery. On the other hand,  1 j  only shortens her path to i. Since the gains of  1 j  from such a direct 
link are lower (the intrinsic values are positive and symmetric), she decides whether the link  1 ij  will 
form
36. Since originally  1 j  has a path of length two to i, she will object as long as  ( ) 2
2 w c δ δ − > . 
Therefore, no pair of core agent and periphery agent who is linked to another core agent would like to 
form a direct link. Third, we will show that no pair of core agent and one of her periphery agents would 
like to severe their mutual link. The core agent will not severe the link since by severing it she loses 
c w − 2 δ  and  c w > 2 δ . The net utility of the periphery agent from this link is at least as high as that 
of the core agent since she gets all her indirect connections through this link. Therefore, she will keep 
the link as well. Last, we will show that no pair of core agents would like to severe their mutual link 
(irrelevant if there is one core agent). If there are only two core agents in the network, i and j, severing 
the link between them will turn the network into two disconnected stars. In this case, the net utility 
gains to agent i from deleting the link are   ( ) 2
2
1 w N w c j δ δ + − . Therefore, she will keep the link 
since  c w w w N w j > > ≥ + 2 1 2
2
1 δ δ δ δ . If there are more than two core agents in the network, 





2 w N w c w N w j j δ δ δ δ + − + +  (her 
direct contact with agent j becomes a length two path, and her length two paths to j's periphery become 





2 δ δ δ δ δ δ δ , 
we get that both core agents will keep the direct link. Thus, we showed that any minimally connected 
core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of 
type b, is pairwise stable.  
However,  there  are  networks  that  are  pairwise  stable  and  do  not  belong  to  the  set  of  minimally 
connected core-periphery networks in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of 
type b. 
The first example is pairwise stable under assumption 2 and not pairwise 
stable under assumption 2*. Consider the following network where the 
black circles stand for type a agents and white circles stand for type b 
agents.  One  can  verify  that  under  the  values 
2
1






3 2 1 = = = = = w w w c δ  , which satisfy the range and 
assumptions 1 and 2 and does not satisfy assumption 2*,  this non-core-
periphery network is pairwise stable. If the linking costs were higher than  
3 w δ ,  assumption  2*  was  satisfied  but  the  network  was  not  pairwise 
stable  since  the  connection  between  the  two  type  b  agents  would  be 
dropped by the agent connected to the core.  
The second example is pairwise stable under both assumptions 2 and 2*. 
Consider the following network where the black circles stand for type a 







3 , 10 ,
2
1
, 1 3 2 1 = = = = = w w w c δ  , which satisfy 
the range and assumptions 1, 2 and 2*,  this non-core-periphery network 
is pairwise stable.  
                                                  
36 This observation is a specific case of the "principle of least interest" that states that the party least 
interested in a relationship determine the intensity of interaction (see Waller and Hill (1951)).   31
In both examples, if the type b agent who is not connected to the core, will severe all his links and will 
form a link with one of the type a agents, the resulting minimally connected core periphery network 
will be pairwise stable. However, it will not Pareto dominate the original network since the type a 
agent with whom the periphery agent formed the link suffers a loss of utility, because in this range of 
linking costs, a direct connection between type a and a type b agents is not worthwhile if they have a 
length two path between them and it does not shorten any of his other paths. 
Now, we will characterize the set of pairwise stable networks which are not minimally connected core-
periphery networks under assumptions 1 and 2. We will show first, that each pair of type a agent are 
directly connected in g. Let  g′ be a network in which there is a pair of type a agents who are not 
directly  connected.  In  order  to  examine  the  minimal  contribution  of  a  direct  link  to  these  agents' 
utilities, assume that a path of length two links them and that connecting them directly does not shorten 
any of their other connections. Their net utility gains from a direct connection are  1
2
1 w c w δ δ − − . 
By assumption 1, ( ) c w w > > − 2 1
2 δ δ δ  and therefore it will surely be beneficial for these agents to 
connect directly, let alone if a longer path links them and/or if the new link shortens their connections 
to other agents. Thus,  g′ is not pairwise stable, and the set of pairwise stable networks is a subset of 
the set of all networks in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected. Next we will show that 
a pairwise stable network must be connected. Let  g ′ ′  be a network in which each pair of type a agents 
are directly connected and there is a pair of agents with no path between them. One component of this 
network includes at least all the type a agents while all the other components include only type b 
agents. Since  c w > 2 δ  it is beneficial for any pair of type a agent and type b agent who do not share 
the same component to connect, even if they supply each other with no indirect shorter paths to other 
agents. Thus,  g ′ ′  is not pairwise stable, and the set of pairwise stable networks is a subset of the set of 
all connected networks in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected. Next, let  g ′ ′ ′  be a 
connected network in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected, each type b agent is 
directly connected to at least one type a agent and there is at least one type b agent (agent i) which is 
directly connected to more than one type a agent (agents  k j j j , , , 2 1 K ). Note that agent  1 j  has a path 
of length two to agent i through agent  2 j  and that none of her shortest paths pass through this agent 
(every type b agent is at least directly connected to one type a agent). Therefore her net gains from 
severing its link to agent i are  ( ) c w w − − 2 2
2 δ δ . Thus, since  ( ) 2
2 w c δ δ − > ,  1 j  would like to 
severe her direct link to agent i and  g ′ ′ ′  is not pairwise stable. In conclusion, a pairwise stable network 
must be a connected network such that each pair of type a agents is directly connected. Moreover, there 
are two possible patterns of connections between the type a and type b agents – either each type b agent 
is directly connected to exactly one type a agent or there is at least one type b agent who is not directly 
connected to any type a agent. Regarding the first pattern, it is left to be shown that in any such 
pairwise stable network there are no direct connections between type b agents. Note that there are two 
kinds of pairs of type b agents – a pair in which both agents are connected to the same type a agent and 
a pair in which the agents are connected to different core agents. Consider the case in which both type b 
agents are connected to the same type a agent. Keeping a direct link provides net utility gains of 
3
2
3 w c w δ δ − −   and  since  ( ) 3
2 w c δ δ − >   this  pair  of  agents  would  prefer  to  sever  the  link. 
Consider the case in which each of the two agents is connected to a different type a agent. Keeping the 
link  provides  net  utility  gains  of  3
3
3 w c w δ δ − − .  Using  assumption  2,   
( ) ( ) 3
3
2
2 w w c δ δ δ δ − > − > , ensures that this pair of agents would prefer to sever the link. Thus, 
if g is pairwise stable of the first pattern it must be a minimally connected core-periphery networks in 
which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. The pairwise stable networks 
of the second pattern are connected networks in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected 
and there is at least one type b agent who is not directly connected to any type a agent. Replacing 
assumption 2 by assumption 2* forces these type b agents who are not directly connected to any type a 
agent to have at least two links. Otherwise, they have one link (the network is connected) and the net 
utility gain of the agent that they are linked to, from severing this link is  3 w c δ − . By assumption 2* 
this gain is positive and therefore under assumptions 1 and 2* the set of non-core-periphery networks is 
the set of connected networks in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected, there is at least 
one type b agent who is not directly connected to any type a agent and each one of these agents has at 
least two links. The two examples above demonstrate exactly this point.       32
Now we will prove that the set of efficient networks is the set of one-gate minimally connected core-
periphery networks in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. Let 
g be a network in which there exists a pair of agents i and j, both of them are type a agents, which are 
not  linked.  Consider  the  network ij g g + = ′ .  The  minimal  difference  in  total  utility  will  be  the 
differences in these two agents' utilities assuming that they have a path of length two between them in g 
and that the new link does not improve any other shortest path in the network (see footnote 35). Thus, 
the minimal difference for both agents is  ( ) 1
2
1 2 w c w δ δ − −  which is positive due to assumption 1 
( ) c w w > > − 2 1
2 δ δ δ . Therefore, for any network g in which there exists a disconnected pair of 
agents i and j, both of them are type a agents, there is a network  ij g g + = ′  with higher total utility. 
Thus, the efficient  network  belongs to the set of networks in  which type a agents are completely 
connected among themselves. Next we will show that the efficient network is a member of the set of 
connected networks in which type a agents are completely connected among themselves. Let  g ′ ′  be a 
network in which each pair of type a agents are directly connected and there is a pair of agents with no 
path between them. One component of this network includes at least all the type a agents while all the 
other components include only type b agents. Consider a pair of type a agent (i) and type b agent (j) 
who do not share the same component. Such a pair exists in any disconnected network. The minimal 
difference in total utility if these agents connect, will be the differences in these two agents' utilities 
assuming that the new link does not improve any other shortest path in the network (see footnote 35). 
Thus, the minimal difference for both agents is  ( ) c w − 2 2 δ  which is positive since  c w > 2 δ . Thus, 
g ′ ′  is not efficient since the total utility in  ij g + ′ ′  is strictly higher. Thus, the efficient network is the 
network that maximizes the total utility of connected networks in which each pair of type a agents is 
directly  connected.  The  last  step  is  to  show  that  the  one-gate  minimally  connected  core-periphery 
network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is this 
network. In any connected network in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected, there are 
( )
2
1 − k k
 paths between two type a agents,  kl  paths between type a and type b agents and  ( )
2
1 − l l
 
paths between two type b agents. Since there is a complete sub-graph of the type a agents all their 
internal  ( )
2
1 − k k
 paths are direct links. Denote by  1 1 ≥ K  the number of direct links between type a 
and type b agents (it must be at least one since it is a connected network) and by  0 2 ≥ K  the number 
of direct links between two type b agents. Thus, there are  1 K kl −  indirect links between type a and 







 indirect links between two type b agents. In addition, since there are l 
type b agents and the network is connected, it must be that  l K K ≥ + 2 1 . The maximal overall value 
of  this  network  is  achieved  when  all  the  indirect  links  are  of  length  two,  and  it  is: 
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The overall value of a one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all the core 
agents  are  of  type  a  and  all  the  periphery  agents  are  of  type  b  is: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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− l l
w l k w c w l c w
k k
δ δ δ δ .  The  difference 
between  the  maximal  value  and  the  one-gate  network  value  is 




2 1 2 2 δ δ δ δ .  Note  that  this  difference  has  to  be  non-
negative since the maximal value has to be at least as high as the total utility of the one-gate minimally 




2 1 w w c K w w c K l δ δ δ δ + − ≥ + − − . 
Since  ( ) ( ) 3
2
2




2 w w c w w c δ δ δ δ + − < + −   and 
therefore  it  must  be  that  either  2 1 K K l > −   or  l K = 1   and 0 2 = K .  Note  that  the  first  option 
violates  the  connectivity  condition  -  l K K ≥ + 2 1 .  In  conclusion,  the  highest  total  utility  among 
connected networks is achieved if this network has the type a agents completely connected among 
themselves, no connections between type b agents and l connections between type a agents and type b 
agents. Due to connectivity it must be that the l links between type b agents and type a agents are   33
divided such that each type b agent has exactly one such link. Therefore, the network belongs to the set 
of minimally connected core-periphery networks. Moreover, we showed that the one-gate minimally 
connected core-periphery network achieves the maximum. To show that other minimally connected 
core-periphery networks do not achieve the maximum note that if all type b agents connect to the same 
type a agent it increases the utility from the indirect links within the type b agents and does not change 
the utility from other types of connections (the connections between type a agents are still of length one 
and l of the intertype connections are of length one and the rest are of length two). Hence, the network 
that  achieves  the  highest  total  utility  among  all  connected  networks  is  the  one-gate  minimally 
connected core-periphery networks in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery 
agents are of type b. Thus, we showed that one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks in 
which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b maximizes the total utility of 
connected networks in which all type a agents are completely connected among themselves. Since 
earlier we showed that disconnect networks and networks in which there are type a agents which are 
not directly connected are inefficient, the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks in 
which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is strongly efficient and there 
are no other efficient networks. 
 
Proof of proposition 4 
 
Let  g  be  the  disconnected  core-periphery  network  in  which  all  core  agents  are  of  type  a  and  all 
periphery agents are of type b. To show that g is pairwise stable we have to verify that pairs of type a 
agents would not like to severe their link, while any other pair of agents would not like to form a link. 
First,  let  us  consider  the  links  between  the  periphery  agents.  The  value  to  the  agents  from  being 
completely isolated is zero while the value for each of them from being directly connected is  c w − 3 δ . 
Since  3 2 w w c δ δ > >  no pair of periphery agents in the disconnected core-periphery network would 
like to form a link. Second, let us consider a pair of a periphery agent and a core agent. The core agent 
gains, by forming the link,  c w − 2 δ  since no indirect connections are formed through the periphery 
agent. Since  2 w c δ >  no pair of core agent and periphery agent in the disconnected core-periphery 
network would like to form a link (note that the considerations of the periphery agent are irrelevant in 
this case due to the mutual consent requirement). Third, let us consider the link between the core 
agents. If there are only two core agents in the network, severing the link between them will turn the 
network into the empty network and therefore they keep the link since  c w > 1 δ . If there are more than 
two core agents in the network, a core agent gains the cost of the link from severing the link. In 
addition, her direct contact with her fellow core agent becomes 2-link path. Thus, her net utility gains 
from  severing  the  link  are  ( ) c w w − − 1 1
2 δ δ   and  therefore  the  agent  will  keep  the  link  since 
( ) c w > − 1
2 δ δ . In conclusion, we showed that the disconnected core-periphery network in which all 
core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable. Note that this 
observation does not depend on the value of Q and therefore it is relevant for both 4.1 and 4.2. We will 
deal with the uniqueness of this pairwise stable network after the proving the efficiency results for both 
4.1 and 4.2. We will prove that the efficient network is either a one-gate minimally connected core-
periphery network where all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b 
(when  0 > Q ) or the disconnected core-periphery network where all the core agents are of type a and 
all the periphery agents are of type b (when  0 < Q ). We will first show that the efficient network has 
no pair of type a agents which are not directly connected. Let  g be a network in which there is a 
disconnected pair of agents i and j, both of them are type a agents. Consider the network ij g g + = ′ . 
The minimal difference in total utility between  g′ and g is the differences in these two agents' utilities 
assuming that they have a path of length two between them and that this link does not improve any 
other shortest path in the network. Thus, the minimal difference for both agents is  ( ) 1
2
1 2 w c w δ δ − −  
which  is  positive  since  ( ) c w > − 1
2 δ δ .  Therefore,  for  any  network  g  in  which  there  exists  a 
disconnected pair of agents i and j, both of them are type a agents, there is a network  ij g g + = ′  with 
higher total utility. Thus, the efficient network belongs to the set of networks in which type a agents are 
completely  connected.  Next  we  will  show  that  the  one-gate  minimally  connected  core-periphery 
network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b has the 
highest total utility among the set of connected networks. Consider the maximal overall value of a 
connected network in which type a agents are completely connected among themselves. In any such   34
network there are  ( )
2
1 − k k
 paths between two type a agents,  kl  paths between type a and type b 
agents and  ( )
2
1 − l l
 paths between two type b agents. Since there is a complete sub-graph of the type a 
agents all their internal  ( )
2
1 − k k
 paths are direct links. Denote by  1 1 ≥ K  the number of direct links 
between type a and type b agents (it must be at least one since it is a connected network) and by 
0 2 ≥ K  the number of direct links between two type b agents. Thus, there are  1 K kl −  indirect links 







 indirect links between two type b agents. Note 
that since there are l type b agents it must be that  l K K ≥ + 2 1 . The maximal overall value of this 
network  is  achieved  when  all  the  indirect  links  are  of  length  two: 
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The overall value of a one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all the core 
agents  are  of  type  a  and  all  the  periphery  agents  are  of  type  b  is 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1









+ − + − + −
− l l
w l k w c w l c w
k k
δ δ δ δ .  The  difference 
between  the  maximal  value  and  the  one-gate  network  is 




2 1 2 2 δ δ δ δ .  Note  that  this  difference  has  to  be  non-
negative since the maximal value has to be at least as high as the total utility of the one-gate minimally 




2 1 w w c K w w c K l δ δ δ δ + − ≥ + − − . 








2 w w c w w c δ δ δ δ + − < + −  
and therefore it must be that either  2 1 K K l > −  or  l K = 1  and 0 2 = K . Note that the first option 
violates  the  connectivity  condition  l K K ≥ + 2 1 .  In  conclusion,  the  highest  total  utility  among 
connected networks is achieved if this network has complete clique of all type a agents, no connections 
between type b agents and l connections between type a agents and type b agents. Due to connectivity 
it must be that the l links between type b agents and type a agents are divided such that each type b 
agent has exactly one such link. Therefore, the network belongs to the set of minimally connected core-
periphery networks in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b. 
Moreover,  we  showed  that  the  one-gate  minimally  connected  core-periphery  network  achieves  the 
maximum.  To  show  that  other  minimally  connected  core-periphery  networks  do  not  achieve  the 
maximum note that if all type b agents connect to the same type a agent it increases the utility from the 
indirect links within the type b agents and does not change the utility from other types of connections 
(the connections between type a agents are still of length one and l of the intertype connections are of 
length one and the rest are of length two). Hence, the network that achieves the highest total utility 
among all connected networks is the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks in which 
all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b. So far we showed that the 
efficient network is either the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks in which all core 
agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b or a disconnected network in which all type a 
agents are completely connected among themselves and this a-component is a one-gate  minimally 
connected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of 
type b (as a conclusion from the proof above). For the last step, let an m-one-gate network be a network 
in which all the type a agents are completely connected among themselves, m of the type b agents are 
connected to the same type a agent (the gate) and the rest of the type b agents are completely isolated. 
We  will  show  that  the  ( ) 1 − l -one-gate  network  has  higher  total  utility  than  all  the  disconnected 
networks in which there is at least one link outside the a-component. Let us explore the disconnected 
networks in which there is at least one link outside the a-component. Since the agents who are not 
connected to the a-component are all of type b we can use proposition 1 of Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996) to assert that since  ( ) 3
2 w c δ δ − >  this group of agents will achieve its maximal total utility 
either as a star encompassing all the group members (b-star) or as an empty network. Thus, we have to 
show that the ( ) 1 − l -one-gate network has higher total utility than the double-component network that 
combines the a-component and the b-star. Let the number of agents in the b-star be h and let the utility   35
of the a-component be  X . The total utility of the  network if the group is organized as a star is 
( )( ) ( )( ) 3
2
3 2 1 1 2 w h h c w h X δ δ − − + − − + . The total utility of the network if all the leaves of the 
b-star replace their links from the b-star center to the gate of the a-component (to create an  ( ) 1 − l -
one-gate network) is at least  ( )( ) ( )( ) 3
2
2 2 1 1 2 w h h c w h X δ δ − − + − − +  since the previous b-star 
center is now isolated (note that it is minimal since we do not count the indirect connections between 
the original members of the a-component and the  1 − h  newcomers). Since the second expression is 
larger, the total utility of the ( ) 1 − l -one-gate network is higher than all the disconnected networks in 
which there is at least one link outside the a-component. Note that so far we have shown that the l-one-
gate network has higher utility than all the connected networks and that the ( ) 1 − l -one-gate has higher 
total  utility  than  all  the  disconnected  networks  in  which  there  is  at  least  one  link  outside  the  a-
component. Remember that as a conclusion from the previous proof above, the m-one-gate network has 
the highest utility among the set of networks in which the a-component includes m type b agents and 
there are no links among the other l-m type b agents. Thus, we have shown that the efficient network is 
the  network  that  achieves  the  highest  total  utility  among  the  set  of  m-one-gate  networks 
( l m , , 0 K = ).  The  total  utility  of  an  m-one-gate  network  is 




2 1 − − − − + − + + − δ δ δ δ . It is easy to see 
that the total utility of the m-one-gate network is an upward parabola in m and therefore its maximum is 
achieved on one of the edges – either  l m =  (one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks 
in  which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type  b) or  0 = m  
(disconnected core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery 
agents are of type b). By the definition of Q it is clear that the difference between the total utility of 
these networks equals exactly  lQ 2 . Therefore, if  0 > Q  the set of one-gate minimally connected 
core-periphery networks in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b are 
strongly efficient and there are no other efficient networks (proposition 4.2.3) while if  0 < Q  the 
disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are 
of type b is the unique strongly efficient network (efficiency part of proposition 4.1). It is left to show 
that  when  0 < Q   there  are  no  pairwise  stable  networks  besides  the  disconnected  core-periphery 
network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b (for this part of the 
proof we will denote this network by d) and to characterize the non core-periphery networks which are 
pairwise stable when  0 > Q . First, we will show that if  0 < Q  the unique pairwise stable network is 
d. Let g be another pairwise stable network. Therefore, either g has two type a agents which are not 
directly connected or it has a directly connected pair of agents, at least one of them is a type b agent. 
Let  g′ be a network in which there is a pair of type a agents who are not directly connected. In order 
to examine the minimal contribution of a direct link to these agents' utilities, assume that a path of 
length  two  links  them  and  that  connecting  them  directly  does  not  shorten  any  of  their  other 
connections.  Their  net  utility  gains  from  a  direct  connection  are  1
2
1 w c w δ δ − − .  Since 
( ) c w > − 1
2 δ δ  it will surely be beneficial for these agents to connect directly, let alone if a longer 
path links them and/or if this link shortens their connections to other agents. Thus,  g′ is not pairwise 
stable. Let  g ′ ′  be a pairwise stable network in which each pair of type a agents are directly connected 
and some of the type a agents are directly connected to type b agents. Let us compare the utilities of the 
agents in network d to their utilities in  g ′ ′ . Type a agents that are not connected directly to type b 
agents  in  g ′ ′   surely  have  higher  utility  in  g ′ ′   than  in  d  since  they  benefit  from  the  indirect 
connections to type b agents without changing their costs. Type a agents that have direct connections to 
type  b  agents  in  g ′ ′   have  the  utility  they  had  in  d  plus  the  utility  they  gain  from  their  direct 
connections to type b agents. Using lemma 1, if  g ′ ′  is pairwise stable, it is straightforward that the 
total relative contribution of each type b agent to his type a neighbor must be non-negative. Therefore, 
the total utility of each of the type a agents is at least as high in  g ′ ′  as it is in d. Thus, the sum of type 
a agents' utilities in  g ′ ′  is at least as high as it is in d.  (note that it might be equal if there is only one 
type a agent in the network). Since in network d the total utility of type b agents is zero and since 
network d is uniquely efficient then there must be at least one type b agent in  g ′ ′ with negative utility 
which contradicts, by the implication of lemma 1, the stability of  g ′ ′ . Thus, in a pairwise stable   36
network  when  0 < Q   type  agents  are  completely  connected  between  themselves  and  completely 
disconnected from type b agents. Let  g ′ ′ ′  be a pairwise stable network in which each pair of type a 
agents are directly connected, there are no direct links between type a and type b agents and there is at 
least one pair of type b agents that are directly connected. Note that the sum of utilities of type a agents 
in  g ′ ′ ′  is equal to the sum of utilities of type a agents in network d. Thus, it must be that the sum of 
utilities of type b agents in  g ′ ′ ′  is negative, since d is uniquely efficient and the sum of utilities of type 
b agents in d is zero. Therefore, there is at least one type b agent in  g ′ ′ ′  that have negative utility which 
contradicts,  by  the  implication  of  lemma  1,  the  stability  of  g ′ ′ ′ .  This  completes  the  proof  that  if 
0 < Q   the  disconnected  core-periphery  network  in  which  all  core  agents  are  of  type  a  and  all 
periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable network.  
Next, we will show some characteristics of pairwise stable networks when  0 > Q . We conjecture, but 
fail to prove, that when  0 > Q  and assumption 1 and 2 hold, the disconnected core-periphery network 
in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable 
network. The following two examples show that when the heterogeneity condition is not satisfied the 
disconnected core-periphery network is not unique.  
Consider the following network where the black circles stand for type a 
agents and white circles stand for type b agents. One can verify that 
under the values  
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3 2 1 = = = = = w w w c δ  , the 
range  and  assumption  1  is  satisfied  while  assumption  2  is  violated. 
However,  in  this  case  this  non-core-periphery  network  is  pairwise 
stable. Moreover, is assumption 2 is violated there are pairwise stable 
networks which are neither connected nor disconnected core-periphery 
networks.  One  can  verify,  for  example,  that  the  network  with  two 
connected type a agents and a separate circle of eleven type b agents is 
pairwise  stable  in  the  given  range  under  the  following  values: 
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Next we will show that when  0 > Q  any pairwise stable network, which is not the disconnected core-
periphery network, is a non-core-periphery network in which all type a agents are directly connected to 
each other and there is no type b agent with exactly one direct connection. Let  g′ be a network in 
which there is a pair of type a agents who are not directly connected. In order to examine the minimal 
contribution of a direct link to these agents' utilities, assume that a path of length two links them and 
that connecting them directly does not shorten any of their other connections. Their net utility gains 
from a direct connection are  1
2
1 w c w δ δ − − . Since ( ) c w > − 1
2 δ δ  it will surely be beneficial for 
these agents to connect directly, let alone if a longer path links them and/or if this link shortens their 
connections to other agents. Thus,  g′ is not pairwise stable, and the set of pairwise stable networks is 
a subset of the set of all networks in which each pair of type a agents are directly connected. Let  g ′ ′  be 
a network in which there is a type b agent, agent i, who has exactly one direct connection. Consider, 
agent j who is the only agent with a direct connection to agent i. agent j's net utility from the direct link 
to agent i is  { } ( ) 3 , 2 ∈ − k c wk δ . Since 
{ } 0 max 2 3 , 2 < − = −
∈ c w c wk k δ δ , agent j, whatever her type is, 
would prefer to severe the link and therefore  g ′ ′  is not pairwise stable. Next we will show that the 
disconnected core-periphery network is the only pairwise stable core-periphery network. Let  g ′ ′ ′  be a 
non-disconnected  core-periphery  network  is  which  all  the  core  agents  are  of  type  a  and  all  the 
periphery agents are of type b. Hence, all the type a agents in  g ′ ′ ′  are directly connected between 
themselves, while all the type b agents are directly disconnected among themselves and there is at least 
one type b agent who is not isolated and is connected directly to type a agent. From the proof above, 
we can deduce that any type b agent who is not isolated has at least two direct connections to type a 
agents. However, since the type a agents are completely connected they can severe the link to this type 
b agent and still have a path of length two connecting them to her. They will prefer to do so since 
( ) c w < − 2
2 δ δ . Therefore,  g ′ ′ ′  is not pairwise stable. Thus, we showed that any pairwise stable 
network is either the disconnected core-periphery network or a non-core-periphery network in which   37
all type a agents are directly connected to each other and there is no type b agent with exactly one 
direct connection.  
 
Proof of proposition 5 
 
First  we  will show that  no  core-periphery network in  which all core agents are of type a and all 
periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable under the given range if assumption 1 holds. Let g be a 
core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b and 
there is at least one direct link between type a and type b agents. Assume that g is pairwise stable. By 
the definition of core periphery networks there are no direct links between type b agents and every pair 
of type a agents maintains a direct link. Let agent i be a type a agent and agent j be a type b agent, such 
that  g ij ∈ . Thus, the benefit that agent i receives from this link is  c w − 2 δ  since this link provides 
agent i with no shorter paths except the one to agent j. Since  ( ) 1
2 w c δ δ − > , assumption 1 guarantees 
that  2 w c δ >  and therefore the benefit of this link to agent i is negative and he would like to severe it. 
Therefore g is not pairwise stable. It is left to show that the disconnected core periphery network in 
which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is not pairwise stable. Assume 
that it is pairwise stable. The net benefit of agent i of type a from the direct link to another agent j, also 
of type a, is  c w − 1 δ  since this link does not shorten any of his other paths. If agent i drops the link to 
agent j he has a path of length two to agent j through a third type a agent ( 3 ≥ k ) which yields  1
2w δ . 
Since  ( ) 1
2 w c δ δ − > , agent i would like to severe his link to agent j. This contradicts the assumption 
that the disconnected core periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery 
agents are of type b is pairwise stable. We showed that if  ( ) 1
2 w c δ δ − > ,  3 ≥ k  and assumption 1 
holds, then there is no pairwise stable core periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and 
all periphery agents are of type b. Note that if assumption 1 is violated then this statement is false. One 
can verify that under the values   6 , 3 ,
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range  and  the  minimal  number  of  type  a  agents  are  satisfied,  assumption  1  is  violated  and  the 
minimally connected core periphery network in which all core agents are of type a, all periphery agents 
are of type b and each type a agent is directly connected to two type b agents is pairwise stable. Now 
we will show that the efficient network is never a core-periphery network in which all core agents are 
of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. Denote by 
g A  the set of type a agents in network g. 
Denote by 
g
c B  the set of type b agents who are not isolated in network g and by 
g
i B  the set of type b 
agents who are isolated in network g. Let  q p CP g , ∈  if g is a core-periphery network in which all the 
core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b, it has p links between type a agents 
and type b agents and 
g
c B q =
37 (Naturally,  q p ≥ ). Let  q p HCP g , ∈  if  q p CP g , ∈ and every pair of 
agents in 
g
c B  have a length two path between them (they have at least one common core neighbor). Let 
q p GCP g , ∈  if  q p CP g , ∈ and there is a member of 
g A  (the "gate") which is directly connected to all 
the agents in 
g
c B . By definition,  q p q p q p CP HCP GCP , , , ⊂ ⊂ ≠ φ . In what follows we will divide the 
total utility of a given network into four components: the utility from the connections between two type 
a agents, the utility from connections between two type b agents, the utility from connections between 
type a and type b agents and the total linking costs
38. Given p and q, the difference in total utility 
among the members of  q p CP ,  comes solely from the connections between pairs of type b agents. This 
is true since the type a agents are completely connected, the total linking costs are identical between all 
                                                  
37 The disconnected core periphery network belongs to  0 , 0 CP , the minimally connected core periphery 
networks belong to  l l CP ,  and the maximally connected core periphery network belongs to  l lk CP , .   
38 
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these networks since the number of connections is fixed, all these networks possess the same number of 
direct links between type a agents and type b agents and therefore also the same number of length two 
connections (there are no longer shortest paths between type a and type b agents due to the complete 
connectivity of the core). Moreover, since the members of 
g
i B  do not contribute anything to the total 
utility, the difference in total utility between the members of  q p CP ,  are solely due to the internal 
connections of the members of 
g
c B . Since the networks in  q p CP ,  are core periphery networks such 
that all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b, they possess no direct links 
between type b agents. Therefore the highest total utility for members of  q p CP ,  is achieved by the 
members of  q p HCP ,  since every pair of connected type b agent has a length two path. In particular, 
this value is achieved by all the members of  q p GCP , . Now we will show that the value achieved by the 
members of  q q GCP ,   is higher than the value achieved by the members of  q p GCP ,  for all  q p > . Given 
q, the differences in total utility between the members of those groups comes solely from the benefits 
and costs of connections between type b agents and type a agents different from the gate. This is true 
since  the  type  a  agents  are  completely  connected,  the  type  b  agents  have  length  two  path  among 
themselves and the total linking costs excluding the connections between type b agents and type a 
agents different from the gate are identical. The members of  q q GCP ,  have no links between type b 
agents and type a agents different from the gate and therefore their additional net benefit is zero. 
However, the members of  q p GCP ,  for  q p >  have at least one link between type b agent and type a 
agent different from the gate. Any such link does not change the utility of other agents since they 
already have a path of length of at most two with both types of agents. Therefore, the contribution of 
this link to the total utility comes only from the shortening of the path between those agents from a 
length two to a length one and each of them pays c for that benefit. Therefore its total contribution is 
( ) [ ] c w − − 2
2 2 δ δ  which is negative. Thus, given q, we showed that for every  q p >  the total utility of 
the  members  of  q p GCP ,   is  lower  than  the  total  utility  of  the  members  of  q q GCP ,   by 
( )( ) [ ] c w q p − − − 2
2 2 δ δ . Since for all  q p >  no member of  q p CP ,  achieves higher total utility then the 
members of  q p GCP , , we showed that none of these networks is efficient. It is left to show that for 
every q the members of  q q CP ,  are not efficient. Actually, since the members of  q q HCP ,  achieve the 
highest total utility among the members of  q q CP , , it is left to show that for every q the members of 
q q HCP ,  are not efficient. The general architecture of these networks is of a core including all type a 
agents completely connected among themselves, q type b agents with single link to a type a agent (the 
"gate") and l-q isolated type b agents. We will show that for every q there is a non core periphery 
architecture which yields higher total utility, namely networks in which the type a agents form a star 
around the gate while the type b agents do not change their linking scheme (all-star architecture). Note 
that the utilities of the type b agents in both architectures are the same – the isolates have zero utility, 
the non isolates have one direct link to a type a agent and length two paths to all other non isolated 
agents (of both types). The utilities of the type a agents from the connections with type b agents are 
also identical – the gate is connected directly to each of the type b agents while the others have paths of 
length two to each of them. Another unchanged component is the utilities from the links of the non gate 
type a agents with the gate. Thus, the difference in utility comes from the benefits and costs of the 
internal connections of the type a agents who are not the gate. In the architecture of the  q q HCP , 's 
members the contribution to total utility from a connection of two non gate type a agents is  [ ] c w − 1 2δ  
while the contribution to total utility from a connection of two non gate type a agents in the all-star 
architecture  is  1
2 2 w δ  ( 3 ≥ k ). Since  ( ) 1
2 w c δ δ − >  the total contribution of such a connection is 
higher in the all-star architecture. Therefore, for every q the non core periphery all-star architecture 
yields higher total utility than the members of  q q HCP , . Hence, we found that every core-periphery 
network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b has a 
network which has higher total utility. Thus, we showed that core-periphery network in which all the 
core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b are not efficient.   
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